Interpretation, Meaning and rules of interpretation of Law and general principles of interpretation of statutes

Introductory Remarks

Interpretation of written legal document is fundamental to the process and practice of law. Interpretation takes place whenever the meaning of legal documents must be determined. Lawyers and judges search for meaning using various interpretive approaches. In the below we discussed these interpretative approaches in details and discuss meaning and concept of interpretation in law and rules of interpretation in written legal documents like constitution, statutes etc. 

Definition of Interpretation of Law

Interpretation means the process of determining the intended meaning of  written legal document like constitution, statutes, contract, deed or will etc. 

Concept of Interpretation of Law

Interpretation in Law has different meaning. Indeed the word "interpret" itself must be interpreted. We can understand the concept of legal interpretation in following ways; Legal interpretation is a rational activity that gives a meaning to a legal text. Interpretation is an intellectual activity, concern with determining the normative message that arises from the text.

Legal Interpretation may also be conceptualize more expensively then the above definition permits. For Example Ronald Dworkin defines law itself as an interpretive process,

"Legal practice is an exercise in interpretation not just when lawyers interpret documents or statutes but also generally. Propositions of law are not simply descriptive of legal history, in a straightforward way, nor are they simply evaluative in some way divorced from legal history. They are interpretive of legal history, which combines elements of both description and evaluation, but is different from both."

Rule of Interpretation

According to Salmond: " By interpreting or construction is meant the process by which the courts seek to ascertain the meaning of legislation through the medium of the authoritative forms in which it is expressed." Salmond refers two kinds of interpretations, grammatical and logical.

Grammatical Interpretation:

In the case of grammatical interpretation only the verbal expression of law is taken into consideration and the courts do not go beyond the litera legis. In the case of logical interpretation, the courts are allowed to depart from letter of the law and try to find out the true intention of the legislature. It is the duty of the courts to discover and act upon the true intention of the legislature. In all ordinary cases, it is the duty of the courts to content themselves by accepting the grammatical interpretation as the true intent of the legislation. It should be taken for granted that the legislature has said what it meant and meant what it has said. The judges are not at liberty to add to or take away from or modify the letter of the law simply because they feel that the true intention of the legislature has not grammatical interpretation is the only interpretation allowable.

Salmond refers to three logical defects by which grammatical interpretation may be affected:

• The first defect is that of ambiguity. The language of a statute may be such that instead of having one meaning, it may be possible to put two or more meanings on the same word. In such cases it is the right and duty of the courts to go behind the letter of the law and try to find out the true intention of the legislature. When two meaning are possible, that which is more natural, obvious and consonant with the ordinary use of language should be put.
• Another defect is that of inconsistency. The different parts of the law may be inconsistent with one another and there by destroy and nullify their meaning. In such a case, it is the duty of the courts to find out the true intention of the legislature and correct the letter of the law.
• The third logical defect may be that law in itself is incomplete. There may be some lacuna in the law itself that may not allow the whole meaning to be expressed. In such cases, the defect can be remedied by logical interpretation and not grammatical interpretation. However, the omission in the law must be such as to make the same incomplete logically. If the law is logically complete, the courts have no business to interfere with the same.

Golden Rule:

Though the literal interpretation must be accepted, it must be applied very cautiously. It should not be followed if the statute is apparently defective. The literal interpretation is a means to ascertain the general purport of the statute or ratio legis. In the difficult cases, the court may go beyond the words of the statute and take help from other sources. This rule is called the Golden Rule.

The Mischief Rule:

When the true intention of the legislature cannot be determined by the language of the statute in question, it is open to the court to consider the historical background underlying the statute. The court may consider the circumstances that led to the introduction of the bill and also to the circumstances in which it became law. When judges are allowed to probe into questions of policy in interpreting statutes, there is bound to be some uncertainty. It is maintained that judges may look at the law before the Act and the mischief in the law which that statute was intended to remedy. The Act is to be construed in such a manner as to suppress the mischief and advance the remedy. The rule of interpretation is known as the mischief rule.

Logical Interpretation:

Logical interpretation is to be put on a statute only when grammatical or literal interpretation is not possible. In such cases, the true intention of the legislature has to be found out by referring to other facts, If the words are ambiguous, that interpretation is to be preferred which prevents the law from becoming absurd and dead letter. In the case of two or more alternative interpretations, that interpretation is to be preferred which is required to fulfill the object of law itself. According to Gray: "Logical interpretation calls for the comparison of the statute with other statutes and with the whole system of law and for the consideration of the term and circumstances in which the statute was passed."

In the case of logical interpretation, it is the duty of the courts to take into consideration the object of the Act and the needs of society. That interpretation is to be put which advances the cause of justice. According to Hohler: " Rules of law are not to be interpreted according to the thought and will of the law-maker, but they are to be interpreted sociologically; they are to be interpreted as products of the whole people  whose organ the law-maker, has become."

Strict and Equitable Interpretation:

When the litera lagis suffers from ambiguity, it usually happens that one of the meanings is more obvious and consonant with the popular use of the language. If this meaning is adopted, the interpretation is called strict or literal. Sometimes, courts reject the natural and most known interpretation in favour of another which conforms better to the intention of the legislature though it may not fit in with the ordinary use of language. When that is done, there is equitable interpretation.

Restrictive and Extensive Interpretation:

Equitable interpretation is either restrictive or extensive, according as it is narrower or wider than the literal interpretation. The rule of restrictive interpretation is applied to penal and fiscal statutes. These laws impose restraints on the liberty of an individual or on the enjoyment of property by him. In such cases, courts are against a construction which imposes a greater burden on the subject than is warranted by the literal meaning of the language employed in the statute.

Historical Interpretation:

The method of historical interpretation is employed while interpreting a statute when its language gives no clue to the intention of the legislature. What is done is that courts consider the circumstances attending the original enactment and give effect to the intention which the legislature would presumably have expressed if its attention had been drawn to the particular question, In Heydon's case, it was laid down that  "for the sure and true interpretation of all statutes in general, be they penal or beneficial, restricting or enlarging the Common Law, four things are to be discussed and considered: first what was the Common Law before the making of the Act; second, what was the mischief and defect for which the Common Law did not provide; third, what remedy the Parliament hath resolved and appointed to cure the disease of the Commonwealth; fourth, the true reason of the remedy; and the office of all the judges is always to make such construction as shall suppress the mischief and advance the remedy and suppress subtle inventions and evasions for continuance of the mischief." However, it is worthy of notice that historical interpretation cannot be adopted in every case.

Sociological Interpretation:

The jurists of the sociological school are prepared to give a lot of freedom to the judges while interpreting a statute. The view of Kohler is that for the determination of the correct interpretation, courts can properly refer to the history of social movements and enquire into the social needs, objects and purposes which were agitating the society at the time of the legislation and which the statute had in view. To quote him: " The opinion that the will of the law-maker is controlling in construing legislation is only an instance of the unhistorical treatment of the facts of the world's history and should disappear entirely from jurisprudence. Hence the principal rules of law are not to be interpreted according to the thought and will of the law-maker, but they are to be interpreted sociologically."

Equity of a Statute:

The principle of equity of a statute is defined by Coke in these words:

 "Equity is a construction made by the judges that cases out of the letter of a statute yet being within the same mischief or cause of making the same, shall be within the same remedy that the statute provideth; and the reason thereof is for that the law-makers could not possibly set down all cases in express terms."

The principle of equity of statute is not favoured by the courts. They are not prepared to fill in lacunae left by the legislature.

Rule of Casus Omissus:

The rule of Casus Omissus provided that omissions in a statute cannot, as a general rule, be supplied by construction. In the case of Parkinson vs Plumpton, the Catering Wages Act, 1943, prescribed minimum wages payable to workers in catering establishments. The schedules to the Act provided for minimum wages when the employer supplied the worker with full board and lodging and when employer supplied the worker with neither full board nor lodging. In that case, the plaintiff was a worker in a catering establishment. She was provided with full board but not lodging. She claimed that she was paid less than the minimum wage payable under the Act. While dismissing the claim, Lord Goddard observed: " I think there is a casus omissus, and that thee draft man has forgotten to provide for the case where, as here, board is provided, but not lodging within the meaning of the schedule. I suppose it was thought that full board would only be supplied when lodgings were provided, and as I have said, lodging seems to be put out of account here. These people were there full time, and so therefore, you have got this unfortunate hiatus. One always tries to construe words so as to give them a sensible construction and prevent their failure, but I do not know of any cannon of construction which enable me to construe where the employer supplies the worker with neither board nor lodging to include a case where the employer supplies full board but no lodging. I can't rewrite the legislation. I must enter judgment for the defendant." (1954) ER201 

General Principles interpretation of Statutes

1. According to Lord Simon: The golden rule is that the words of a statute must prima facie be given their ordinary meaning. We must not shirk from an interpretation which will reverse the previous law, for the purpose of a large part of our statute is to make lawful that which would not be lawful without the statute, or conversely, to prohibit results which would otherwise follow. Judges are not called upon to apply their opinion of sound policy so as to modify the plain meaning of statutory words, but where in constrained general words, the meaning of which is not entirely plain, there are adequate reasons for doubting whether the legislature could have been intending so wide an interpretation, the narrower of which would fail to achieve the manifest purpose of the legislation, we should avoid a construction which would reduce the legislation to futility and should rather accept the bolder construction based on the view that Parliament would legislate only for the purpose of bringing about an effective result."
2. The words used in a statute should be construed in the popular sense. If those are used in connection with some particular business or trade, they will be presumed to be used in a sense appropriate to or usual in such business or trade.
3. The words in a statue should be taken to have been used in the sense that bore at the time the statute was passed, According to Lord Esher: "The first point to be borne in mind is that the Act must be construed as if one were interpreting it the day after it was passed."
4. As far as possible, statutes should be interpreted in such a way as to avoid absurdity. According to Jervis, G.J: "If the precise words used are plain and unambiguous, we are bound to construe them  in their ordinary sense, even though it does lead to absurdity or manifest injustice. Words may be modified or varied where their import is doubtful or obscure, but we assume the functions of legislators when we depart from the ordinary meaning of the precise words used , merely because we see, or fancy we see an absurdity or manifest injustice from an adherence to their literal meaning."
5. The interpretation of statute should be in accordance with the policy and object of the statute in question. According to Lord Halsbury : It is impossible to contend that the mere face of a general word being used in a statute precludes all enquiry into the object of the statute or the mischief which it was intended to remedy.
6. No body has a vested right in procedure. There is no presumption that a change in procedure is prima facie intended to be prospective only and not retrospective. According to Black-burn : "Alterations in the form of procedure are always retrospective, unless there is some good reason or other way they should not be"